This paper estimates the magnitudes of government spending and tax multipliers within a regime-switching framework for the U.S economy during the period 1949:1-2006:4. Our results show that the magnitudes of spending multipliers are larger during periods of low economic activity, while the magnitudes of tax multipliers are larger during periods of high economic activity. We also show that the magnitudes of fiscal multipliers got smaller for episodes of low growth, while they got larger for episodes of high growth in the post 1980 period.
Introduction
to classify exogenous tax changes. Ramey (2011) estimates the spending multipliers to be between 0.6 and 1.2, while Romer and Romer (2010a) find that an exogenous tax increase of 1 percent of GDP lowers real GDP by almost 3 percent.
Among the more recent studies that do not use VARs, Barro and Redlick (2011) estimate defense spending multipliers with two-stage least squares, using annual data for different samples where the estimated multipliers lie between 0.6 and 0.7.
The approaches mentioned above, with the exception of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) , employ linear models in estimating the tax and spending multipliers. A common characteristic of these studies is that the magnitude of the multipliers does not vary over the business cycle. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) employ a regime switching VAR where transitions across recessions and expansions are smooth. By imposing the restriction that the U.S. economy is in recession 20 % of the time, they estimate that the total spending multiplier is 0.57 during expansions and 2.45 during recessions, while the defense spending multiplier is 0.8 during expansions and 3.56 during recessions.
In this paper, we investigate empirically whether fiscal multipliers are quantitatively different in magnitude during "good times" and "bad times". To do so, we use a multiple regime framework first suggested by Hamilton (1989) . We contribute to the literature by estimating the benchmark regression of Barro and Redlick (2011) within a Markov-Switching framework. Government spending multipliers are identified from variations in the defense news variable constructed by Ramey (2011) and the tax multipliers are identified from the exogenous tax variable constructed Romer and Romer (2010a) . Ramey (2011) shows that defense spending accounts for almost all of the volatility of government spending, but also argues that shocks to government spending or defense spending can be anticipated ahead of actual spending. This has important implications because anticipated future changes in government spending can affect current economic activity. She shows that the standard VAR shocks do not reflect news about defense spending accurately and that the Ramey-Shapiro war dates Granger-cause the VAR shocks. Ramey (2011) also acknowledges that the simple dummy variable approach does not exploit the potential quantitative information available regarding the news about military spending and for this purpose constructs a new measure of defense news variable, which reports the anticipated changes in defense spending. We use this measure to identify shocks to government spending and to calculate the spending multipliers.
One major obstacle in calculating tax multipliers is endogeneity. As GDP increases, we observe an increase in tax revenues and vice versa. This makes the calculation of tax multipliers very difficult. Romer and Romer (2010b) argue that most changes in revenues are endogenous responses to non-policy developments. They analyze federal tax actions from 1945 to 2007 and identify four categories. Of these four categories, spending-driven and countercyclical tax changes are defined as endogenous tax changes, while deficit-driven longrun tax changes are categorized as exogenous tax changes. We use the exogenous tax changes in estimating the tax multipliers.
The non-linear model employed in this paper separates periods of high and low states of the world for the endogenous variable (the change in real GDP per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period, which can also be interpreted as per capita growth), and therefore allows us to estimate separate fiscal multipliers for periods of low growth, and periods of high growth. We find that the spending multiplier is 2.91 for periods of low growth and 0.13 for periods of high growth, while the tax multiplier is -0.19 for periods of low growth and -0.66 for periods of high growth. Our results show that the magnitudes of the spending multipliers are larger during episodes of low growth, while the magnitudes of tax multipliers are larger during episodes of high growth -a result that emphasizes the importance of non-linearities for fiscal multipliers. Moreover, the non-linear framework used in this study provides larger multipliers for periods of high growth and smaller multipliers for periods of low growth during the post-1980 era when compared to the whole sample period, which indicates that previous findings about the post-1980 multipliers might be biased since they do not differentiate between different states of the economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the methodology employed in the paper. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and results. Section 4 concludes.
Methodology
We propose an alternative way of detecting the causality dynamics between lagged fiscal policy instruments and economic growth. The regime-switching model considered in this paper 1 allows for shifts in the mean, for periods of high economic growth and low economic growth, and is given by:
where y t = change in real GDP per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period, x t = real present discounted value of expected change in defense spending per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period, z t = change in real exogenous tax liabilities per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period, and w t = squared government bonds spread. Given that s t is unobserved, estimation of (1) requires restrictions on the probability process governing s t ; it is assumed that s t follows a firstorder, homogeneous, two-state Markov chain. This means that any persistence in the state is completely summarized by the value of the state in the previous period. Therefore, the regime indicators {s t } are assumed to form a Markov chain on S with transition probability
, where
and
, where each column sums to unity and all elements are nonnegative. The probability law that governs these regime changes is flexible enough to allow for a wide variety of different shifts, depending on the values of the transition probabilities.
For example, values of p ii (i ∈ S) that are not very close to unity imply that structural parameters are subject to frequent changes, whereas values near unity suggest that only a 1 The model is based on the Markov switching representation proposed by Hamilton (1989 Hamilton ( , 1990 ).
few regime transitions are likely to occur in a relatively short realization of the process. {ε t } are i.i.d. errors with E(ε t ) = 0 and E(ε 2 t ) = 1. {s t } are random variables in S = {1, 2} that indicate the unobserved state of the system at time t. It is assumed that {ε t } and {s t } are independent. Also, note that the independence between the sequences {ε t } and {s t } implies that regime changes take place independently of the past history of {y t }.
We are interested in documenting estimates of the low-high phase growth rates, µ l and µ h , but mainly in investigating the extent to which fiscal policy instruments are associated with the low-high phase growth rates. Autoregressive terms (up to four lags) are also considered. Therefore, the parameters vector of the mean equation (1) is defined by µ (i) (i = 1, 2) , which are real constants. The autoregressive terms
¢ , and
¢ measure the impact of change in real government purchases per capita, average marginal tax rate, and squared spreads respectively. The parameter vector is estimated by maximum likelihood. The density of the data has two components, one for each regime, and the log-likelihood function is constructed as a probability weighted sum of these two components. The maximum likelihood estimation is performed using the EM algorithm described by Hamilton (1989 Hamilton ( , 1990 ).
Empirical Analysis

Data
The variables employed in this paper consist of the change in real GDP per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period (y t ), the real present discounted value of expected change in defense spending per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period (x t ), the change in real exogenous tax liabilities per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period (z t ), and squared government bonds spread (w t ). These variables are constructed as follows:
y t = (Change in Nominal GDP scaled by Nominal GDP of the previous period/ GDP Deflator) / Total Population, including armed forces overseas;
x t = (Nominal present discounted value of expected change in defense spending scaled by nominal GDP of the previous period / GDP Deflator) / Total Population, including armed forces overseas; z t = (The change in nominal exogenous tax liabilities scaled by nominal tax liabilities of the previous period / GDP Deflator) / Total Population, including armed forces overseas; w t = Spread between long-term government bonds interest rate and 3-Month Treasury Bill rate.
Nominal GDP and the GDP deflator are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and interest rates are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Nominal present discounted value of expected change in defense spending and total population, including armed forces overseas are from Ramey (2011) and the change in nominal exogenous tax liabilities are from Romer and Romer (2010b 
Results
The null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of Markov regime switching cannot be tested directly using the standard likelihood ratio (LR) test. We properly test for multiple equilibria (more than one regime) against linearity using the Hansen's standardized likelihood ratio test (1992, 1996) . The value of the standardized likelihood ratio statistics and related P -values (Table 1) under the null hypothesis (see Hansen (1992 Hansen ( , 1996 for details) provides strong evidence in favour of a two -state Markov mean-variance regime-switching specification 2 .
Please Insert Tables 1, 2 and Figure 1 about here Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the model described above are reported in Table  2 . The model appears to be well identified, parameters are significant, and the standardized residuals exhibit no signs of linear or nonlinear dependence (Ljung-Box statistics for dependency in the first moment and for heteroskedasticity). The periods of high and low economic growth seem to be accurately identified by the filter probabilities, which clearly separates the two regimes. Figure 1 shows the plots for change in real GDP per person scaled by real GDP per person of the previous period, y t , and its corresponding estimated filter probabilities. In deriving the results, several hypotheses are investigated: the effect of fiscal policy instruments in periods of (i) low growth ¡ β Table 2 , the following points are noteworthy.
As documented in Table 2 , the spending multiplier is estimated as 2.907 for periods of low growth and 0.131 for periods of high growth for the entire sample starting in 1949:1 and ending in 2006:1. These results indicate that spending multipliers are larger during episodes of low growth and smaller during episodes of high growth.
It should be noted that the spending multipliers that we have estimated are actually the multipliers associated with anticipated changes in military spending based on news. As argued by Barro and Redlick (2011) , multipliers associated with non-defense purchases would be more relevant to evaluate fiscal stimulus packages, but they acknowledge that these multipliers are hard to estimate since there is a great deal of the endogeneity between the movements in nondefense spending and real GDP and therefore they estimate multipliers for defense spending. They argue that the defense spending multiplier would provide an upper bound for the nondefense multiplier. Our multipliers should be interpreted similarly. They represent an upper bound for the non-defense multiplier during periods of high and low growth.
As shown in Table 2 , unlike the military news multipliers, the estimated tax multipliers are smaller for periods of low growth compared to periods of high growth, -0.194 and -0.663 respectively. This particular result implies that government expenditures are more effective policy instruments during "bad times", and taxes are more effective policy instruments during "good times". However, one should also note that the estimated multipliers are quite small, and possibly cannot justify fiscal policy in general as an effective stabilization tool in the short-run. That does not mean, however, that fiscal policy is an ineffective policy tool in the long-run. One should also keep in mind that the long-term growth effects of fiscal policy are also well-documented (Kneller et al., 1999 , among others).
Another interesting question is whether fiscal policy has indeed become less effective in today's globalized world with increased labor and capital mobility, as suggested by Perotti (2002) . To be able to answer this question, we estimated our benchmark regression for the 1980:1-2006:4 sub-sample. The empirical findings, which are summarized in Table 2 , reveal that while the low growth multipliers got smaller (2.471 and 0.158 for expenditures and taxes respectively), the high growth multipliers got larger (0.143 and -0.4292 for expenditures and taxes respectively). This result makes sense as today's globally integrated financial markets allow capital to move more freely in response to fiscal shocks, especially when capital is more abundant.
Robustness Checks
In this section, we check the robustness of our results by using the average marginal tax rates, z * t , calculated by Barro and Redlick (2011) . Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates are reported in Table 3 . By means of Akaike criterion an autoregressive of order one was selected for y t showing a positive effect (γ 1 = 0.301). The estimated multipliers are qualitatively similar, and all of our results remain essentially the same. We should note that the magnitude of the multipliers, with the new tax variable become slightly smaller.
Conclusion
By identifying fiscal policy shocks, using the narrative approach, we estimate the magnitude of fiscal multipliers within a non-linear framework. The empirical results show that the magnitudes of the spending multipliers are larger during times of low growth, while the magnitudes of tax multipliers are larger during times of high growth. Our results imply that there is a role for fiscal policy as a stabilization tool by using the "right instrument" at the "right time". Another contribution of our paper is, contrary to the previous literature, to show that multipliers during periods of low growth get smaller, and multipliers during times of high growth get larger in the post-1980 era relative to the whole sample period. This particular result implies that the comparison of fiscal multipliers between periods in linear VAR studies might be biased. Larger multipliers during periods of high growth could be explained with the larger share of investment (and capital) in GDP during expansionary periods. Further avenues for research may include further disaggregation of fiscal shocks to find out exactly which budget items can be used to stabilize the economy during recessions (or expansions). As Perotti (2002) contends that the U.S. is an outlier in terms of response to fiscal policy actions, there is also some benefit applying our framework to other countries, given data availability. Note: * y t = change in real GDP per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period, x t = real present discounted value of expected change in defense spending per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period, z t = change in real exogenous tax liabilities per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period, w t = squared government bonds spread. z * t is the average marginal tax rate constructed by Barro and Redlick (2011) . * * The Hansen's standardized Likelihood Ratio test P-values are calculated according to the method described in Hansen (1992 Hansen ( , 1996 , using 1,000 random draws from the relevant limiting Gaussian processes and bandwidth parameter M = 0,1,. . . ,4. Test results for the presence of a third state are also reported. Notes: Filter probability refers to the probability to be in the low state as a result of parameter estimates reported in Table 2 .
